Reaping What We Have Sown

Why is there an Militant Islamist insurgency in Iraq? Did it just "appear" when Saddam was overthrown, or was the foundation of a Salafist/Takfirist Islamist state already taking root during the '90s when Saddam's regime was weakened by international sanctions, as well as Shi'a and Kurdish rebellion (after years of oppression).

One of the epiphanies I experienced while I was in Iraq was the degree to which former Ba'thists were involved in the leadership of various Jihadist groups which MNF-I all, rightly or wrongly, categorized as Al Qai'da in Iraq (AQIZ, IZ being the country code for Iraq). Ansar Al-Islam, Ansar Al-Sunnah, 1920 Brigades.. Umar Brigades, and let's not forget Al Qai'da. All of these are among the most prevalent of the Sunni based insurgent groups. For the moment, I will refrain from addressing the Shi'a factions, since the focus of this post is to point out that militant Islamism was a rising force that not even Saddam was successful at containing. But here is a general list of current insurgent groups operating in Iraq:

http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centcom/iraq/Terrorism-in-Iraq.html

One of the fundamental questions that has remained begging to be asked is why has the nature of the insurgency taken on an Islamist tone? Why, in the wake of Saddam's overthrow, did we not see the Sunnis rally around already organized resistance movements such as the Fidayin Saddam (Saddam's men of sacrifice) and thus, preserving a Ba'thist "tone" to the insurgency? The message from many in the main stream media and anti-war pundits is that Saddam, nasty as he might have been, was at least secular dictator and thus, a "ally" in our war against militant Islam. But if Saddam were really as powerful as everyone claims, Al Qai'da should have been squashed by the Sunnis tribal leaders the very minute it attempted to compete with the Ba'thists for control over the insurgency.

Instead, the Fidayin (also anglicized as Fedayeen), although a force of resistance during the early months after Saddam's fall, were quickly dismantled as an organization, and their members drifted to the Islamist groups. Of course, this might have been also due to their proclivity to tatoo themselves with heart or wings, topped by an F (for Fidayin).

Now, another point that seemed to elude understanding is why Syria, despite long standing rivalries between the Syrian Ba'thist party and Saddam, did not provide support to the Iraqi Ba'thist, if only out of sheer self-preservation of their veracity of their own ideology (as as to potentially finally seize control over the Iraqi Ba'thist political apparatus). One would think that the Syrians would have had an interest in promoting a Ba'thist insurgency, rather than assisting in inciting an militant Sunni Islamist resistance movement that might undermine its own authority in Damascus (look up Hama and Assad to fully understand the logic).

IMO, the reality is that the only authority the Ba'thists had in ruling Iraq was their ability to implement a "divide and conquer" strategy amongst the Sunni tribes, pitting them against one another for Saddam's favor (translate as money and political power), while increasing their representation within Saddam's administrative and military/intelligence machine (think patronage system). I believe the same situation exists within Syria, and Bashir Al-Assad has relatively little control over the activities those Ba'thist officials who secretly have a duel allegiance to the Islamist factions.

Over and over again, I would see reports of individuals formerly part of the Ba'thist party apparatus, now apparently involved with Al Qai'da and/or Ansar Al-Sunnah (the 2 dominant Jihadist factions). The Umar (Omar) Brigrade was reportedly recruited from the ranks of former Republican Guards, Special Security, and Intelligence members, to fight against the Shi'a Badr brigades. But no one willing to claim allegiance to Ba'thism.

If one doubts me, then let's look at the capture of Abu Ayman, one of the biggest, baddest, terrorist cell leaders in the Baghdad area for several years. He was someone who was closely linked to Abu Mu'sab Al-Zarqawi, and was reported next in line to become the "Amir" (Prince) of Baghdad representing Al Qai'da in 2005, after Abu Azzam was killed. But who is Abu Ayman?:

http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369955

Mohammed Hila Hammad Obeidi(Ubaydi), aka Abu Ayman, "was formerly the chief of staff of intelligence under the regime of Saddam Hussein and was most recently the leader of the Secret Islamic Army, a secret militia operating in the Babil province".

Now ask yourselves how a man, supposedly one of the highest members of Saddam's Intelligence Service, heavily vetted for his Ba'thist loyalties, suddenly opted to become a militant Islamist? Why didn't he just represent himself as a Ba'thist, with aim of restoring Ba'thism to nation of Iraq? How did a man, who would rapidly turn from secular ideology, strongly oppsed to militant Islam, rise to such a rank that he became the COS of Saddam's intelligence service?

And then there is the case of Sa'ad Ali Firas and his associates, most of whom were former members of Saddam's intelligence/security entities:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/10/mil-051020-mnfi01.htm

Now, I could go on about discussing the multitude of former members of Saddam's intelligence and security agencies who have risen to leadership within either Al Qai'da or Ansar Al Sunnah, including some who were former bodyguards for Saddam's family. But there's not much "publicly available" documentation to support this, primarily because the members of the press have not posed these questions to MNF-I PAO briefers and much of it remains classifed.

Why is no one asking this question, you might ask?

Well, some people HAVE asked this question. Ray Robinson was a member of the DOCEX operation for the Iraq Survey Group, and he has expressed many of the same questions and perspectives that I did during my period in Iraq:

http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/10/fallujah_baathist_and_wahhabis.html

To sum this up.. those who would contend that Saddam's regime was a secular dictatorship ignore the fact that it was increasingly becoming dependent upon, if not infiltrated by, individuals who did not share the secular ideology of Ba'thism. It was merely a convenient means for them to survive, until such a time that they possessed sufficient control over the military and intelligence, to stage a coup.

Anyone remember what happened to Sadat?

http://www.nmhschool.org/tthornton/jihadorgan.php

"In the 1990s, Egyptian members of al-Jihad merged with Osama bin Laden's organization, al-Qaeda ("the Foundation"). One of Jihad's leaders, Ayman al-Zawahiri, became one of Osama bin Laden's chief lieutenants.

And what would have been the US response to such a coup by a Jihadist motivated government? What COULD our response have been, except to wring our hands and accept it. After all, Saddam's overthrow was what we were hoping for, right? How could we oppose any faction that managed to accomplish that?

By overthrowing Saddam ourselves, what we did was unleash the pent-up Salafist forces that ALREADY existed in Iraq and were simply binding their time until the proper opportunity arose to take charge. We permitted these Salafists to gain power during the '90s by weakening Saddam's power, rather than just overthrowing him as punishment for the invasion of Kuwait. We threw him into the hands of the Salafists, without who's support, he could not defend the regime against the rebellious Shi'a and Kurds. He put "Allah Ahkbar" on the Ba'thist Iraqi flag in recognition of his growing dependence on the Salafists. He built them HUGE mosques within which to pray and spread their Islamist ideas. Saddam was riding the back of an Islamist "Tiger", hoping that controlling it's agenda, he could prevent himself from being devoured by it.

Thus, by not removing Saddam in 1991, when we had real justification (and the necessary troops) we have reaped what we have sown.

The Scrutinizer